Use the research and analysis you have done in this module on the history, development, and functionality of UAS, and the human factors issues related to their operations to provide a response to the following scenario.

You have been hired as a consultant due to your expertise in UAS human factors issues by a small UAS startup company, specializing in precision agricultural crop dusting operations. This company has just been awarded a contract to conduct their operations on a few large farms in a rural part of a very large state. Unfortunately, when the local newspapers published some details of this operation a number of citizens became very concerned because they did not want “drones” flying in their community and spying on them. There is so much concern, that a member of the county commission has proposed a local ordinance banning all “drone” operations in their jurisdiction for 3 years. There will be a vote on the ordinance, and your company has asked you to use your expertise to speak at the open forum to convince the local community to let their operations go forward by describing the benefits to agriculture, and assuring people that “drones” will not be used to spy on them. Use the following questions to get started and generate some ideas about what to say to the community in order to reassure them about your company’s intentions.

What effect, if any, has the ubiquitous use of the term “drone” to refer to all categories of UAS in popular culture and the media had on the public perception and future utility of UAS?
Do the terms used to describe and identify these systems matter?
Do you think that future commercial applications of UAS have been hindered by inaccurate reporting and the perception that they are used primarily for spying on and killing enemy combatants in warfare?

The term drone has all but solidified an image in the public mind that all of these systems are meant to spy or conduct nefarious operations meant to harm or even kill. The movies have assisted in this perception by ingraining images of robots firing large caliber weapons or wielding large knives on unsuspecting people. These images, some gruesome some not, have fueled the fire of the public perception as it relates to most unmanned systems. The media has sensationalized the issue such that drones are dangerous and meant to spy and harm (Landforce, 2016). The media has focused mostly on who has been arrested for flying a drone here or there, drones are killing people, drones are spying on people, instead of the good that these systems do in terms of 3D mapping, search and rescue, precision agriculture, or delivering much needed medicines to people in third world countries (Mulligan, 2015). If the media and people in general were to focus on the good this technology can do then it is fair to say the public perception may change. If we are going to discuss this technology accurately we most also take into account the term drone as it relates to autonomy to include semi-autonomous, fully autonomous and systems that are remotely piloted. A semi-autonomous system is one that requires some human interaction while a fully autonomous system requires little to no human interaction while a remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) is on that may be unmanned but still flown by a pilot through the use of a ground control station. The term drone is not used in the military to describe the MQ-1B Predator or MQ-9 Reaper because these systems are not drones (completely autonomous) rather they are RPV’s. This change in public perception must also be addressed by the industry which can help turn the negative connotation into a positive technology that is meant to do good. This can be achieved through an effort to educate the public on the technology and the many positive uses of such systems (Mulligan, 2015). It is important to educate the public through positive media reports, articles, and others. Perceptions do not change overnight but through positive examples we can begin to sway the population to the good side of the technology. This will in turn help the long term growth, help us to utilize this technology to its full potential and for the greater good. We will spark the imagination of school children around the world who want to learn the inner workings of software, aerodynamics, engineering and other disciplines that will keep us moving forward. To foster in the next wave of innovators that will come up with the next uses for this amazing technology. It starts here, small steps, the corn field down the road, the soybeans in the next county, the farmer who can get the water information he needs in minutes as opposed to hours. Find the infestation of worms in the center of the field and kill it before it spreads. If you could use a technology that could save you time and give you the ability to do things you’ve never be able to do before isn’t that worth your time? It is the difference between putting food on the table and losing it to a parasite.

References

Landforce, C. (2016). Drones in the media: why you should care about Kanye West. Retrieved from https://3dr.com/drones-media-kanye-west/ (Links to an external site.)

Mulligan, C. (2015). Getting rid of negative drone perceptions. Retrieved from http://sdtimes.com/getting-rid-of-negative-drone-perceptions/ (Links to an external site.)

Watch the “Rise of the Drones” documentary below and answer the following questions:

1. What did you learn from this documentary that you did not already know about UAS?
2. Select one human factors issue/problem that was highlighted in the documentary for manned aircraft, and one for UAS. How can these issues/problems be designed out of a future variant of the system?

I must admit this is not the first time I have seen this video. This video has been the subject of many discussion forums in past classes I have taken in MSUS program. I am still amazed at the technology that is present in these systems from the GCS to the data links to the air vehicle itself as well as the pilots that fly them. In such a relatively short period of time we have gone from Kill Devil Hill to the sound barrier to unmanned aircraft that are capable of being piloted from thousands of miles away. As General Deptula, (RET) said, “where we are in terms of unmanned aerial vehicle is about the same place we were with bi-planes after world war I” (Nova, 2013). I have been in this field, specifically the unmanned aviation side of the house for almost a year now and I will be the first to admit I was not exactly thrilled to be a part of it. This has been the most challenging flying I have done to date and one that continues to challenge me in every way, shape and form. What I did not understand until I became an RPA pilot was the intelligence cycle, operational planning, development and the corresponding mission execution. During the WWII years it took months to collect information and process it to create the actionable intelligence needed to create a mission that would have an operational value to the objectives determined by military leadership. Once this was determined it would then take time to gather the hundreds of aviation assets needed as well as the munitions and bombs in order to prosecute targets with the actionable intelligence that was collected over the months. In the mid 1900’s the military had to develop aircraft for specific missions such as intelligence gathering and separate aircraft for attack missions. Today these capabilities are melded together into one aircraft, specifically the predator series of unmanned aircraft. With this system the entire information collection/processing/actionable intelligence/mission execution can be accomplished in a matter of minutes where it use to take months.
Military aircraft, specifically the manned SR-71 and U-2 aircraft were created for a specific mission. To fly higher, and in some cases faster, to collect information on the enemy while staying out of range of surface to air missiles. As a result there were limitations with the aircraft as well as the pilot. The U-2 pilots’ mission effectiveness/endurance is limited to 12 hours and aircraft, such as the SR-71, required refueling every two hours. Today, these manned aircraft are considered to have significant limitations although the dragon lady’s still have a significant role in intelligence collection. The predator family of unmanned aircraft can stay aloft, in some cases, up to three times that of the U-2 and the SR-71 collecting the same types of information quickly relaying to an operations center whereby analysts can quickly make determinations. As a result of real-time collection a nine-line can be issued in a matter of minutes by commanders.
References

NOVA. (2013). Rise of the drones. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ikuu2VU2WCk

Review the multimedia materials (videos and reports) related to the CBP Predator B and the Fairchild AFB B-52 crashes in Activity 4.2 – Multimedia Review. Then, define CRM and describe what role you think it played in these accidents. What are the similarities and differences between the two cases? If you were assigned as the lead investigator, what recommendations from a human factors and CRM perspective in particular would you make to prevent similar incidents in the future?

Air crews spend an exorbitant amount of time working on these skills in simulators as well as evaluated flights in the GCS by instructor pilots (IP’s). CRM, to me, is the ability to utilize all available resources and assets to accomplish a task and common goal safely. The most important of the relationships, for pilots, is that with the sensor operators although others such as avionics techs that are normally a part of the mission are often included in the CRM process. An example, the sensor is responsible for checklist usage, situational awareness as well as assisting the pilot in command (PIC) with maintaining a safe and productive flight environment. The CRM process is conducted through the use of effective communications between crew members, timely and concise decision making, and the use of leadership abilities and principles in the cockpit or GCS to increase safety.

The B-52 accident that occurred at Fairchild is more than just a CRM issue in my mind. It appears that leadership completely overlooked the fact that Lt. Col. Holland had not once, but several times, violated safety of flight procedures by placing the aircraft and crew at risk through unsafe flight maneuvers (slowmodan, 2011). Furthermore, Lt. Col. Holland by performing these maneuvers exhibited a hazardous attitude that was brought to leadership and was ignored. Flight fitness is not a laughing matter and it would appear this was not only CRM of sorts but more so a legal/criminal issue.

The MQ-9 accident was also more than a CRM issue. The pilot, a person who I worked with, was placed in this role well before he was ready. As a result, things were skipped in the training process in order to fill the need. Additionally, it was not just one issue that brought down the aircraft but a number of issues. First, checklist procedures were missed and not completed. Had the checklist been followed the rack switch would have been successful and the controls matched. This is very important in all variants of the aircraft especially the 9 with the turbine and the condition lever. The pilot chose to do the checklist by memory, however, his memory was based on the warrior alpha version of aircraft; a piston powered airplane (Tvaryanas, n.d). The pilot therefore chose to do the work on his own instead of calling out to the sensor operator the failure and the corresponding checklist for the sensor to read. In this case CRM did not occur. Once the switch occurred the pilot noticed the aircraft was not maintaining altitude and decided to send the aircraft lost-link thinking it would climb to initial lost link altitude and proceed on the emergency mission. This was not the case because of the mismatch controls on the sensor station which became the pilot station the aircraft engine was cut therefore lost-link altitude was negated as was the fact that both the pilot and the sensor operator forgot to update the emergency mission (Tvaryanas, n.d.). I don’t recall if the emergency mission was ever loaded but if it was not loaded the aircraft would, according to programming, start a loiter in the spot of lost link and climb to altitude where it would remain until regained.

These two cases are similar in one respect and dissimilar in many. The resulting accident occurred because of two pilots that should not have been in the left seat. Dissimilar because the pilot of the 52 was not mentally competent and the reaper pilot because he was not adequately trained. Similar again because it appears Lt. Col. Holland was not attempting to practice CRM or he would not have placed the aircraft and crew in the situation that ultimately created the accident nor did the reaper pilot attempt CRM. Furthermore, Lt Col McGeehan, the right seater, as indicated in the video, attempted to correct the situation by practicing some form of crew resource management that apparently was not taken into consideration.

If I were the investigator on the Air Force side, well, I’m not sure what I would do as it appears to be more of a criminal situation. The MQ-9 however, I would have to insist more emphasis placed on CRM and the ability of crews to work together. It’s a fact that not everyone gets along so I place more emphasis on reporting the ability of crews working together interpersonally. If it’s not possible then being able to match those that work well together may be important. Just an observation on the unmanned side.

References

Slowmodan. (2011). The news story behind the Fairchild AFB 1994 B-52 crash. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LgJl7b9bQH0

Tvaryanas, A., Thompson, W. (n.d.). Unmanned aircraft system (uas) operator error mishaps: an evidence based prioritization of human factors issues. Retrieved from http://www.wpafb.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090417-032.pdf (Links to an external site.)

Fatigue and stress are major safety hazards for crews of long haul, manned aircraft as well as long endurance UAS. What is the relationship between fatigue and stress? How does one affect the other? What are the unique causes of fatigue and stress in UAS that are not present in manned aircraft? What do you think are the most effective fatigue and stress countermeasures that crews of both UAS and manned aircraft can use to mitigate the risk associated with these hazards?

When one reacts to physical, mental or emotional stimuli it can cause stressors that effect your health and functioning. Stress is defined as an organism’s total response to environmental demands or pressures (Medical dictionary, 2016). As a result, stress can either be short-term or long-term. One symptom of long-term stress is that of fatigue. Fatigue is defined as a state of diminished physical or mental efficiency (FAA, n.d.). Fatigue causes a dulling of senses, thought and reflexes (FAA, n.d.). Some of the unique causes of fatigue and stress in the UAS field have to do with duty periods. UAS crews typically work multiple, rotating, or both shift types unlike those crews who typically work day or irregular shifts (Thompson, 2006). Jansen, Van Amelsvoot, Kristensen, Van den Brandt and Kant (2003) noted the prevalence of fatigue in rotating shift workers was 24-29% compared to 18% for day workers and 19% for irregular shift workers. Therefore, due to the nature of UAS operations, chronic and periodic in nature, these crews are more susceptible to fatigue. The chronic and periodic nature can be explained by the split operations of the Predator series aircraft. The two crews split between the Middle East, the launch and recovery element (LRE) and the United States, the mission control element (MCE). Often, the LRE element is very sporadic in nature with launches and handoffs typically taking a couple to three hours then followed by complete boredom and downtime. The MCE phase of the operation can last for extensive periods then again followed by the recovery phase lasting another couple of hours.

Effective countermeasures to stress and fatigue can be implemented to help reduce the effects of these situations. Such countermeasures can be implementing a 12 hour duty period with more consecutive days off which should maintain operator peak performance (Thompson, 2006). More direct measures are medical evaluations to determine levels of shift-work disorders, development of a rest program, improved crew rest areas, exercise rooms and lighting and climate control improvements (Thorby, 2010).

References

Federal Aviation Administation Civil Aerospace Medical Institute. (n.d.). Physiology of flight: fatigue in aviation. Retrieved from https://archive.org/details/gov.faa.safety.3 (Links to an external site.)

Jansen, N. W. H., Van Amelsvoort, L. G. P. M., Kristensen, T. S., Van den Brandt, P. A., & Kant, I. J. (2003). Work schedules and fatigue: A prospective cohort study. Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 60(Suppl 1), i47-i53

Medical Dictionary. (2016). Stress. Retrieved from http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/stress (Links to an external site.)

Thompson, W. (2006). Effects of shift work and sustained operations: operator performance in remotely piloted aircraft. Retrieved from http://www.wpafb.af.mil/shared/media/document/afd-090121-043.pdf (Links to an external site.)

Thorby, M. (2010). Shift Work Disorder. Retrieved from http://media.mycme.com/documents/29/culpepper_2010_swd_suppl_7021.pdf (Links to an external site.)

What do you think of his assertions concerning the future of autonomous operations of armed UAS? Do you agree or disagree, why? What safeguards do you think should be put in place to guard against the future he predicts? In what commercial applications could a completely autonomous UAS be used?

When I started this program I had an understanding of what unmanned aviation was due to my background. In 2003, while sitting in an operations center in Tikrit, Iraq, I received a call from higher informing me that the predator was ours for a period of three hours. At that very moment we received rover video and the system was commanded to follow a white vehicle that just attacked an operating base with mortars. The base plates for the mortars were located in the bed of this truck and positively identified. Within minutes that vehicle was destroyed by 30mm fire from an Apache. At that moment I had a feeling the face of war would be forever changed. This is the beginning of skynet. Life imitating art appears to be the case.

Since the late 1990’s I’ve watched the RQ-1 go from an ISR platform to the MQ-1 platform that is capable of launching hellfire missiles. These systems are remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) but the natural progression is towards autonomy. These systems are not capable, at this point, of making the decision to fire weapons. That doesn’t mean they can’t be upgraded to do so. As stated in the video, the PRV is the precursor to autonomous robotic weapons (Suarez, 2013). I do think he is correct. This is a very dangerous proposition and I think it’s one that is easily attainable at this point. Take a look at the DARPA challenges. These vehicles created by academia with government funding can negotiate obstacles through the use of LiDAR, high powered CPU’s to process algorithms, positioning sensors and more. If they can do this they can process information through self-learning algorithms to make the decision call to fire a weapon system. Do I think there will be international law that prohibits the use of such technology? I think the answer, ultimately, is yes. I also think that we are not a proactive group by nature and it will take some sort of nasty accident to help facilitate. We are so focused on this technology and the data it is producing. We cannot keep up with it, period. With the advancement of technology the data will continue to grow which means we’ll need further automation/technology/software to process all of this data produced by the unmanned systems. Case in point; ARGUS.

Not only is the RPV a stepping stone to completely autonomous systems but so is the data. In 2004 UAS collected a total of 71 hours of video (Suarez, 2013). In 2011 300,000 hours of video (Suarez, 2013). This isn’t soon to change with systems like Gorgon stare and Argus (NOVA, 2012). These are data producing sensors to the likes of which we’ve not seen before. It is a known fact we don’t have the manpower to process all this data (Erwin, 2012). We will not be able to keep up and will need employ software to do the work for us (Suarez, 2013). The data production will facilitate further change especially as these systems become more prolific. I don’t want to sound pessimistic or negative but I’m not sure what, if any, safeguards can be put in place at this point to stop this snowball. We have humans-in-the-loop to make crucial decisions such as producing/receiving a 9-line. The Department of Defense directive number 3000.09 is in place and states; Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force (Department of Defense, 2012). This is a directive. Directives can change and something more binding should be put in place, internationally. I’m just not sure if we are past this point.

Commercial applications for UAS such as precision agriculture, search and rescue and mapping have great possibilities. When we start talking about law enforcement and government uses this is where it will become an issue. Issues such as privacy and the ability of the automated decision making without a human will be much debated in the near future.

References

Department of Defense. (2012). Autonomy in weapons systems. Retrieved from www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf (Links to an external site.)

Erwin, S. (2012). Too much information not enough intelligence. Retrieved from http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/May/Pages/TooMuchInformation,NotEnoughIntelligence.aspx (Links to an external site.)

NOVA. (2012). Rise of the drones. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QFUUxcuyDN0

Suarez, D. (2013). The kill decision shouldn’t belong to a robot. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pMYYx_im5QI

Spatial Disorientation (SD) has been a causal factor in aviation accidents since its inception. Exhaustive studies have been conducted to identify the causes of this condition in manned aircraft, and train crew members to recognize, confirm, and recover from its potentially deadly onset. SD in UAS however has not been extensively studied due to the fact that human beings are remotely operating the aircraft and because of that were not subjected to the classic conditions associated with SD. For this discussion, answer the following questions:

What are the different types of SD and how can they occur in UAS? Does SD affect an UAS crew member differently than in a manned aircraft? What SD mechanisms specific to UAS can be identified? What can be done to prevent SD in UAS? Are there any GCS modifications that could be made to lessen the likelihood of SD occurring?

There are several different forms of illusions that can create spatial disorientation in aircraft as well as UAS. Spatial orientation is our natural ability to maintain our body orientation and/or posture in relation to the surrounding environment at rest and during motion (FAA, n.d.). In FAA studies as a result of aircraft accidents the FAA has concluded that between 5% -10% of all general aviation (GA) accidents can be attributed to spatial disorientation of which 90% are fatal (FAA, n.d.). The 2 main types of common illusions that are associated with flight; somotogravic and somatogyral (Jedik, 2013). Somatogravic occurs during acceleration and deceleration that can create a sensation of climbing and descending (Jedik, 2013). Inside the ground control station you would be less susceptible to such sensation as a result of being still and you are not experiencing linear acceleration or deceleration as one experiences in a traditional aircraft. Somatogyral illusions during straight and level flight can create situations such as the leans where a pilot has a false sense of the horizon or have a sense of turning in the opposite direction (Jedik, 2013). Personally, I have not seen these types of illusions in unmanned aircraft like I have in traditional manned platforms.

The aerial perceptive illusions are prevalent in UAS, especially the systems that I work with, that create issues when landing especially looking through the soda straw. For example, on final approach to the runway at Dugway Proving Ground one may experience an illusion as a result of the extremely long runway (was an alternate for the space shuttle) and may create the illusion of being too high. This can create a tendency to push the stick forward to get down the landing surface creating a situation that could result of nosing the aircraft into the runway. A final approach to an unusually wide runway may give the impression of being lower than actual (FAA, n.d.). This could result in the pilot pitching the aircraft at low speed resulting in a stall and possible accident. A final approach over flat terrain that has an upsloping runway may result in the illusion that one is conducting a high altitude final (FAA, n.d.). Correcting this could result pitching the aircraft down and cause an accident. Conversely, a final over flat terrain with a downsloping runway could produce the illusion of a low-altitude final. If one believes this illusion the resulting in pitching nose up to gain altitude with possibly a low power setting and airspeed resulting in a stall. One way to help mitigate such illusion is to trust the instrumentation and spend time working on these issues in a simulator. Another way to combat this type of disorientation is to trust in the right seater and ask questions about the approach especially if you feel like you could be experiencing such a situation.

References

Federal Aviation Administration. (n.d.). Spatial disorientation: visual illusions. Retrieved from www.faa.gov/pilots/safety/pilotsafetybrochures/media/spatiald.pdf (Links to an external site.)

Jedik, R. (2013). Spatial disorientation. http://goflightmedicine.com/spatial-disorientation/ (Links to an external site.)

The DoD has a wide variety of requirements for the selection and training of UAS pilots based on the aircraft flown, mission requirements, and branch of service. Some platforms like the US Air Force MQ-9 Reaper and RQ-4 Global Hawk require rated officers to fly them, while the RQ-11 Raven UAS can be controlled by an enlisted US Army technician with minimal aeronautical training. With this information in mind, answer at least two of the following questions: Why are there different philosophies on crew member selection? Do you agree with the current process of matching the requirements to the size or mission of the UAS to be flown? How do you think the FAA should deal with the same situation when issuing rules about UAS integration into the NAS? Based on the current FAA requirements for UAS pilots, do you think there should be a more uniform standard that applies equally to all UAS, or continue to be tailored to fit specific situations and aircraft?Why are there different philosophies on crew member selection?
The Army has mostly enlisted personnel working as both operators of the aircraft as well as the sensor. Most of the section oversight is conducted by a Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) that is a rated pilot and flew rotary or fixed wing aircraft and are trained in the specific UAS. At the small tactical unit level, such as Infantry Company, the unit is assigned a Raven team that comprises three systems and two operators (US Army, 2006). The Raven is a non-military occupational specialty (MOS) descript position (US Army, 2006). These systems are designed to be man-packable, quickly assembled and easily flown but those that have little to no experience in aviation. On the other hand, larger systems such as the MQ-5 Hunter requires MOS specific training at FT Rucker, Alabama in the many flight principles but does not require the individual to be a commissioned officer nor possess a background in aviation. Other systems, such as the Grey Eagle also require specialized training for flying at higher altitudes as well as specific training on the ground control stations that utilize the auto land and auto takeoff capability.
The Air Force has traditionally utilized commissioned officers with flight time in manned aircraft as operators of unmanned aircraft. Only recently has this rule changed when Secretary of the Air Force James announced that enlisted personnel will be allowed to operate the unarmed RQ-4 Global Hawk (Schogol, 2015). The Chief of Staff of the Air Force stated there were no plans to utilize enlisted pilots on systems such as the MQ-1 and MQ-9 aircraft (Schogol, 2015). I imagine this is because the Global Hawk requires little if any stick and rudder skills compared to that of the Predator and Reaper aircraft.
Based on the current FAA requirements for UAS pilots, do you think there should be a more uniform standard that applies equally to all UAS, or continue to be tailored to fit specific situations and aircraft?
Yes, I feel there should be a requirement for all UAS pilots. I think this should be broken down into classes/weight of UAS. Everyone, regardless of hobby use or commercial use, should be aware of the rules and the regulations as they pertain to airspace. AC-91-57 that was issued in the 1980’s has been cancelled by the FAA (FAA, 2015). This advisory circular basically gave some guidelines which remote control pilots should operate in. With all the discussion about UAS the new rule for UAS and remote controlled aircraft further spells out the definition of aircraft and their right to control such flights in the national airspace. Furthermore, it goes on to explain what a model aircraft is used for (FAA, 2015). The problem is and will continue to be people who abuse the use of sUAS which has happened numerous times. For example, an individual decided to fly their system during a wild fire in Phelan, California in 2015 causing issue with a fire crews and fire aircraft trying to fight the fire (CNN, 2015). This stemmed for a lack of education, among other things, as well as a lack of regulations. Going back to the weight issue. Regulations should be split for systems depending on weight of the system and the role the system plays. Furthermore, pilot certification should occur as well for those who plan to use these systems commercially. If going to operate commercially then the operator should be required to take a written knowledge test every couple of years. With the massive influx of these systems the FAA has a massive task on trying to keep the skies safe with systems that are capable of flying at altitudes and individuals that lack the common sense and knowledge to keep these systems out of the way of other commercial traffic.

References
CNN. (2015). Above spectacular wildfire on freeway rises new scourge: drones. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/18/us/california-freeway-fire/
Department of the Army. (2006). FM 3-04.155: Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations. Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-04-155.pdf
Federal Aviation Administration. (2015). AC-91-57 Cancelled. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentid/22425
Schogol, J. (2015). Air Force to have enlisted pilots for the first time since world war II. Retrieved from http://www.airforcetimes.com/story/military/2015/12/17/air-force-have-enlisted-pilots-first-time-since-world-war-ii/77490376/

The use of UAS to conduct domestic surveillance in the United States has become a major issue for a number of concerned citizens. With the incredible expansion of UAS operations that is predicted in the near future, the right to privacy that is currently enjoyed by all will potentially be threatened. The fourth amendment to the Constitution’s guarantee against “unreasonable search and seizure” is often cited in legislation that is being drafted to curtail the operation of UAS by government agencies in the United States. Also, the ability of private citizens or organizations to operate sophisticated surveillance equipment with very little cost has some people so concerned that many support banning UAS completely from American skies. In order to explore these issues, answer at least two of the following questions:

How can these concerns be addressed while at the same time allow industry to maximize the benefits of commercial and government UAS domestic operations?

The only way, in my observation, is to allow the FAA to continue to plan for the integration of the NAS. The only way industry is going to grow, and for technology to improve, is to continue to allow and foster an environment where technological growth and advancement is encouraged (IbisWorld, 2015). Privacy is always going to be a concern, however, in a commercially viable airspace rule and regulations should be placed on what the systems can and cannot do. No matter the limits I think it is inevitable, no matter the rules and regulations in place, there will privacy complaints as long as people see UAS. This is not just limited to the DJI Phantom’s flying around but also larger systems capable of higher altitude flight. Another large obstacle to overcome is the terminology that has made it’s way into our everyday lexicon. Drone. The fact of is we do not operate fully autonomous systems that go from point A to point B. Just yesterday I attended a pop-up safety brief. Part of this brief was focused on how to change the people’s views about unmanned aircraft by not using the term ‘drone’. They are in fact aircraft that are remotely piloted. As long as we use this term it will conjure up images of the terminator, autonomous computer controlled flying killing machines from the same series of movies which will have a lasting effect on the public image of such systems.
How can citizens be assured that their fourth amendment rights are not being violated by the use of UAS in government operations?

The only way this can be assured is to have limited government utilization of such systems. If such systems are allowed then it should be public knowledge who and what agency is allowed to operate such systems and for what purpose. Furthermore, the agency should publish its usage policy for all to see and suggest that citizens concerned about their privacy should call a specific number. Basically this is happening now without the specific regulations. The FAA requires all entities to apply for and hold an exemption from certain parts of the federal aviation regulations (FAA, 2016). As a result, the applications and approvals are listed on the website with the exact terminology of what they’re allowed and not allowed to do. People should become familiar with these types of documents if they are concerned for their privacy because an informed person is an educated person and one that will not make decisions based on misinformation.

References
Federal Aviation Administration. (2016). Unmanned aircraft systems. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/uas/faq/
Ibis World. (2015). Drone industry hinges on defense spending and regulations. Retrieved from http://media.ibisworld.com/2015/01/29/droneindustry/

Case Analysis Effectiveness
The case analysis is a general tool used to document and report analytical thinking. In this course the use of the case analysis tool definitely applies by bringing the reality of the situation into the classroom. It has been a useful means to analyzing both systems and problems that pertain to situations and designs of systems. Although I do believe the case analysis has applicability to the syllabus in this course and human factors, I do believe it will have even further applicability in fields where systems design, aerodynamics, avionics and engineering are the goals. My research paper for this course covered the upcoming changes that may take place in the NAS as a result of UAS and what it may mean for ATC. This methodology proved to be an excellent way to document my findings as well as the ability to document options related to potential regulations, networked systems such as NextGen and operators; critical and analytically documented. In my line of work, currently, there is not much need for use in documenting analytical thinking. However, my future job may change where I will need to use these skills to accurately analyze and document such findings. One suggestion for these courses would be to do more group type activities. Obviously we all come from different backgrounds and some have a lot of experience in aviation, both manned and unmanned, but some don’t. Therefore, to integrate a group to conduct analytical thinking on a subject and then assign sections of writing in a case analysis may be a good way to create group dynamics. Also, it has been my experience thus far in graduate school, especially distance learning,that it is mostly built around individual experience and work. In the work environment it is seldom all about the individual accomplishing tasks as it is about the group achieving its stated goals. To start building this group dynamic and teamwork concept will further many individuals in their careers.

Already commercially available is the Intel RealSense camera and an Intel processor. In 2015 Intel and Ascending Technologies partnered to build a system capable of sense and avoid. (Intel, 2015). As we already know these systems can be dangerous in that they are flying through the air and can cause bodily harm if one is to come into contact with the system. This type of technological advance is also very important as it relates to the integration of these systems into the national airspace and the very important safety aspects to commercial aircraft operations. In small UAS under 55lbs this is a fantastic option for those wanting to protect themselves and others from what can possibly be a very dangerous situation. The system is comprised of 6 RealSense cameras mounted on top of a quadcopter to create a 360 degree view and the Intel processor which is used to extract all relevant data (Intel, 2015). This information is then passed to a triple redundant Ascending Technologies trinity autopilot which calculates position data and processes obstacle awareness commands allowing the quadcopter to sense and avoid anything in its path, autonomously without the need of GPS (Intel, 2015). An educated guess, the heaviest part of this design is the cameras atop the quadcopter which are the R-2003D variety. After reviewing the Ascending Technologies site it appears they are using an x86 board and atom processor but other research points to the ability to utilize a Core I7 processor and unspecified board capable of the size, weight and power (SWAP) needed to allow for an adequate period of flight. The AscTec triple redundant IMU ensures quick and reliable data fusion that can verify and precisely maneuver the systems position, altitude and orientation (Ascending Technologies, 2015). The triple redundancy allows the IMUs to test information against each other so it can verify the most reliable position and signal possible plus allows for backup in the case of IMU failure (Ascending Technologies, 2015).

References

Ascending Technologies. (2015). Amazing technology. Retrieved from http://www.asctec.de/en/
Intel. (2014). CES 2015 Intel keynote: Intel RealSense technology and AscTec drones. Retrieved from http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/events/ces-2015-intel-keynote-realsense-technology-asctec-drones-video.html