Review the multimedia materials (videos and reports) related to the CBP Predator B and the Fairchild AFB B-52 crashes in Activity 4.2 – Multimedia Review. Then, define CRM and describe what role you think it played in these accidents. What are the similarities and differences between the two cases? If you were assigned as the lead investigator, what recommendations from a human factors and CRM perspective in particular would you make to prevent similar incidents in the future?
Air crews spend an exorbitant amount of time working on these skills in simulators as well as evaluated flights in the GCS by instructor pilots (IP’s). CRM, to me, is the ability to utilize all available resources and assets to accomplish a task and common goal safely. The most important of the relationships, for pilots, is that with the sensor operators although others such as avionics techs that are normally a part of the mission are often included in the CRM process. An example, the sensor is responsible for checklist usage, situational awareness as well as assisting the pilot in command (PIC) with maintaining a safe and productive flight environment. The CRM process is conducted through the use of effective communications between crew members, timely and concise decision making, and the use of leadership abilities and principles in the cockpit or GCS to increase safety.
The B-52 accident that occurred at Fairchild is more than just a CRM issue in my mind. It appears that leadership completely overlooked the fact that Lt. Col. Holland had not once, but several times, violated safety of flight procedures by placing the aircraft and crew at risk through unsafe flight maneuvers (slowmodan, 2011). Furthermore, Lt. Col. Holland by performing these maneuvers exhibited a hazardous attitude that was brought to leadership and was ignored. Flight fitness is not a laughing matter and it would appear this was not only CRM of sorts but more so a legal/criminal issue.
The MQ-9 accident was also more than a CRM issue. The pilot, a person who I worked with, was placed in this role well before he was ready. As a result, things were skipped in the training process in order to fill the need. Additionally, it was not just one issue that brought down the aircraft but a number of issues. First, checklist procedures were missed and not completed. Had the checklist been followed the rack switch would have been successful and the controls matched. This is very important in all variants of the aircraft especially the 9 with the turbine and the condition lever. The pilot chose to do the checklist by memory, however, his memory was based on the warrior alpha version of aircraft; a piston powered airplane (Tvaryanas, n.d). The pilot therefore chose to do the work on his own instead of calling out to the sensor operator the failure and the corresponding checklist for the sensor to read. In this case CRM did not occur. Once the switch occurred the pilot noticed the aircraft was not maintaining altitude and decided to send the aircraft lost-link thinking it would climb to initial lost link altitude and proceed on the emergency mission. This was not the case because of the mismatch controls on the sensor station which became the pilot station the aircraft engine was cut therefore lost-link altitude was negated as was the fact that both the pilot and the sensor operator forgot to update the emergency mission (Tvaryanas, n.d.). I don’t recall if the emergency mission was ever loaded but if it was not loaded the aircraft would, according to programming, start a loiter in the spot of lost link and climb to altitude where it would remain until regained.
These two cases are similar in one respect and dissimilar in many. The resulting accident occurred because of two pilots that should not have been in the left seat. Dissimilar because the pilot of the 52 was not mentally competent and the reaper pilot because he was not adequately trained. Similar again because it appears Lt. Col. Holland was not attempting to practice CRM or he would not have placed the aircraft and crew in the situation that ultimately created the accident nor did the reaper pilot attempt CRM. Furthermore, Lt Col McGeehan, the right seater, as indicated in the video, attempted to correct the situation by practicing some form of crew resource management that apparently was not taken into consideration.
If I were the investigator on the Air Force side, well, I’m not sure what I would do as it appears to be more of a criminal situation. The MQ-9 however, I would have to insist more emphasis placed on CRM and the ability of crews to work together. It’s a fact that not everyone gets along so I place more emphasis on reporting the ability of crews working together interpersonally. If it’s not possible then being able to match those that work well together may be important. Just an observation on the unmanned side.
References
Slowmodan. (2011). The news story behind the Fairchild AFB 1994 B-52 crash. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LgJl7b9bQH0
Tvaryanas, A., Thompson, W. (n.d.). Unmanned aircraft system (uas) operator error mishaps: an evidence based prioritization of human factors issues. Retrieved from http://www.wpafb.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090417-032.pdf (Links to an external site.)